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Can Democracy Create World Peace? 
Democratic Peace Theory: Misguided Policy or Panacea
Alynna Lyon
Department of Political Science
Can democracy create world peace? The idea that representative liberal governments can dimin-ish the occurrence of war is one of the most  
appealing, influential, and at the same time, contro-
versial ideas of our time. For centuries, thinkers have 
proposed that a world of democratic countries would 
be a peaceful world. As early as 1795, Immanuel Kant 
wrote in his essay Perpetual Peace that democracies 
are less warlike. Within the United States, this idea has 
held particular sway. Presidents like Woodrow Wilson 
have embraced this idea and advocated the creation of 
democracies to create a less belligerent world. Harry S. 
Truman once said, “Totalitarian regimes imposed on 
free peoples…undermine the foundation of internation-
al peace and hence security of the United States.”1 
The Democratic Peace Theory is based on several 
premises. The first argues that in democracies, popula-
tions will restrain elected leaders. This is to say that 
given the choice, people will be reluctant to bear the 
costs of war in terms of human life and financial trea-
sure. Second, many think that democracies will use 
political institutions to settle their domestic disputes. 
Therefore, when conflict arises with another democracy, 
they will be more apt to use international institutions 
(i.e., the United Nations, International Court of Justice, 
G-8 Summits, etc.) to resolve their international dis-
agreements. Others believe that democracies produce a 
political culture of negotiation and conciliation, claim-
ing that people in democracies are taught that violence 
is not an appropriate means of conflict resolution. The 
argument holds that if a war-prone leader comes to 
power in a democracy, other institutions (e.g., Congress) 
will present cross-pressures (here checks and balances) 
and prevent an aggressive head of state from moving a 
country to war. Finally, people in democracies are be-
lieved to be more sympathetic and tolerant of people in 
other democracies.2 Thus, whether it is common norms, 
institutional constraints, mutual respect, or popular 
will—democracy is viewed as a treatment for war
Democratic Peace and Political Science
In the 1970s, scholars began using the tools of social 
science to explore this thesis and have uncovered a 
significant amount of empirical research that supports 
these claims. Today there are over a hundred authors 
who have published scholarly works on the Democratic 
Peace Theory. One study examined 416 country-to-
country wars from 1816-1980 and found that only 12 
were fought between democracies.3 Bruce Russett writes 
that “Established democracies fought no wars against 
one another during the entire twentieth century.”4  
Another proponent found that that the probability of 
any two democracies engaging in war is less than half  
of 1%!5 This is not to say that democracies have not gone 
to war, but when considering pairs (or dyads) of democ-
racies, there are almost no instances of war between 
two democracies. Four decades of research consistently 
finds significant support for this position. Moreover, the 
findings remain robust as the number of democracies in 
the world continues to grow. In fact, as Jack Levy points 
out, Democratic Peace Theory is “as close as anything 
we have to an empirical law in international relations.”6
Democratic Peace and American Foreign 
Policy 
Beyond academics, the last two presidential administra-
tions have particularly embraced this research as a  
policy objective and a way to build world peace. Presi-
dent Clinton in his 1994 State of the Union Address 
proclaimed, “Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure 
our security and to build a durable peace is to support 
the advancement of democracy elsewhere. Democra-
cies don’t attack each other.” More recently, current 
President George W. Bush stated, “And the reason why 
I’m so strong on democracy is democracies don’t go to 
war with each other. And the reason why is the people 
of most societies don’t like war, and they understand 
what war means… I’ve got great faith in democracies 
to promote peace. And that’s why I’m such a strong 
believer that the way forward in the Middle East, the 
broader Middle East, is to promote democracy.”7 This 
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discussion has generated considerable excitement and 
promoted growing expectations by both policy makers 
and Western publics that this is something we should be 
pursuing.8 This theory has come close to conventional 
wisdom and served as a foundation for both moral and 
political missions. Former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger writes, “[a] majority of the American leaders 
were convinced then as they are now that America has a 
special responsibility to spread its values as its contribu-
tions to world peace.”9 
The Problems of Democratic Peace 
Just as the Democratic Peace Theory has its supporters, 
it has also generated considerable criticisms. Alexan-
der Hamilton presents an early rejection of this idea in 
Federalist No. 6, writing: “Sparta, Athens, Rome, and 
Carthage were all republics; two of them, Athens and 
Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as 
often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the 
neighboring monarchies of the same times. Sparta was 
little better than a well regulated camp; and Rome was 
never sated of carnage and conquest.”10
In terms of the current research, establishing the cor-
relations have been relatively easy; however, establishing 
causation is more problematic. In fact, most scholars 
do not agree on why democracies are more peaceful. In 
addition, the research itself has come under heavy criti-
cism with scholars claiming that the evidence changes 
depending on how you define “democracy,” “war,” and 
“peace.” One rebuttal to the democratic peace theory is 
found in the Big Mac Peace Theory; this cheeky modifi-
cation points out that no two countries with a  
McDonald’s have ever gone to war.11 The argument 
claims that what the scholars are actually measuring 
is economic development, not democracy. Here some 
argue that a stable middle class (people who like their 
current status) will not support a war that may jeopar-
dize their standard of living. Alternatively, the causal 
factors may be powerful economic elites who block any 
move towards aggression against a country where they 
hold financial ties and where war puts their economic 
interests at risk. Along these lines, one compelling study 
finds that the Democratic Peace Theory only holds 
true between two democracies that have reached high 
standards of economic development. Here the research 
finds that poor democracies are more likely to fight each 
other.12 So, perhaps it is economic development, global 
capitalism, and the interdependence of foreign trade 
that impedes war, not democracy.13
Stronger opponents actually argue that “good sci-
ence” is creating dangerous policy. There are those that 
fear that the research provides justification for countries 
to go on democracy crusades. One issue they raise con-
cerns the assumption that democracies create peaceful 
peoples. Here, scholars question the idea that popular 
will can mitigate war, particularly since war seems to 
be rather popular in certain democracies.14 The United 
States presents an interesting example of this as public 
approval ratings of U.S. presidents tend to skyrocket 
during war. For example, President George H.W. Bush 
saw his public approval ratings rise to an unprecedented 
89% during the 1991 Persian Gulf War when Americans 
“rallied around the flag.” 
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the Demo-
cratic Peace Theory concerns implementation—how do 
you create a world of democracies? Here we find two 
minds, one that advocates the active pursuit of a globe 
full of democracies and one that promotes a more  
passive policy. The latter view is found in the early  
writings of Thomas Jefferson as he proclaimed, “A just 
and solid republican government maintained here will 
be a standing monument and example for… people 
of other countries.”15 Jefferson held that leadership by 
example (where Western and American governments 
practice virtue, self-restraint, and rule of law) would be 
contagious. The second, stickier position involves the 
active or even forceful pursuit of democratic political 
systems. This position assumes that democracy will 
be welcomed across the globe and can be transplanted 
with relative ease. However, we are beginning to see that 
some people do not see democracy as desirable. In fact, 
there are people who view the Democratic Peace Theory 
and its policy implications as thinly veiled imperialism. 
In effect, they view the spread of democracy as an effort 
to homogenize the world, rejecting local culture, indig-
enous institutions, and even popular preferences. Thus, 
rather than viewing themselves as liberated, people and 
their leaders in many non-democratic countries hear 
this policy mandate as smug rhetoric. This also touches 
on the very contentious debate about whether “gunpoint 
democracy” will work or whether this actually pres-
ents a contradiction to the ideas of conflict resolution 
through nonviolence.
Another thorny issue is that democratically elected 
governments may not guarantee peaceful interests. Here 
“one must be careful what one wishes for” as democrati-
cally elected leadership may not always be benign and/
or may pursue agendas in contrast to American inter-
ests. For example, during the Iraqi war Turkish voters 
pressed their government not to provide support to the 
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U.S. invasion of Iraq. The newly elected Hamas majority 
in the Palestinian National Authority has also demon-
strated its agenda is far from peaceful. 
In conclusion, there is strong support on both sides  
of the debate. One finds the quest for democratic 
universalism as a powerful panacea to interstate war, 
while the other sees it as a misguided and dangerous 
foreign policy. What the debate does point out is that 
creating democracies is enormously complicated and 
requires significant time. One cannot just set up ballot 
boxes, hold elections, and create moderate Democrats 
and Republicans. Issues like rule of law, civic culture, 
a stable and committed middle class, and legitimacy of 
a democratic system may take years, if not decades, to 
build. Furthermore, in Electing to Fight: Why Emerging 
Democracies Go to War, Edward Mansfield and Jack 
Snyder point out that transitional states or “semi- 
democratic regimes” may be extremely dangerous and 
actually more likely to start wars.16 There is no guaran-
tee that the introduction of democratic institutions  
will be smooth, permanent, or accepted by either the 
political elites in a country or by the masses. In fact, 
some scholars point out that in most cases of newly  
created democracies (the third-wave democracies)  
the political institutions are weak, frail, and easily  
reversible.17 
Perhaps it is helpful to remember that in the United 
States (typically regarded as the democratic success 
story) it took almost 200 years, a civil war, a woman’s 
suffrage movement, and a violent civil rights move-
ment before we had universal suffrage and granted 
most citizens of the country the right to participate in 
politics. Thus, it may take decades or even generations 
to establish embedded norms of tolerance, compromise, 
and the value of power sharing in transitional coun-
tries. One thing remains clear: the ideas and debate on 
Democratic Peace Theory will persist in both academic 
and policy circles. This is particularly true as the United 
States attempts implementation of these ideas in Iraq. 
In fact, Presidential candidate Senator John McCain 
recently affirmed his support for this view, calling for 
a “new League of Democracies [to] form the core of an 
international order of peace based on freedom.”18
The research is exciting and leads this author to  
optimism. At the same time, this is a guarded opti-
mism, as the scholarship needs to be implemented with 
a sophisticated understanding and a fine instrument. 
Forcibly pulling the weeds of non-democratic regimes 
by their roots and bluntly transplanting western  
democracy into areas where the soil may not be fertile 
may be ineffective and actually promote violence. A fact 
that policymakers tend to overlook is that in order for 
the Democratic Peace Theory to hold, democracy itself 
must be authentic, robust, stable, and accompanied by 
economic development.
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